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Virus gene sequencing and phylogenetics can be used to study the epidemiological dynamics of rapidly evolving viruses. With
complete genome data, it becomes possible to identify and trace individual transmission chains of viruses such as influenza virus
during the course of an epidemic. Here we sequenced 153 pandemic influenza H1N1/09 virus genomes fromUnited Kingdom
isolates from the first (127 isolates) and second (26 isolates) waves of the 2009 pandemic and used their sequences, dates of isola-
tion, and geographical locations to infer the genetic epidemiology of the epidemic in the United Kingdom.We demonstrate that
the epidemic in the United Kingdomwas composed of many cocirculating lineages, among which at least 13 were exclusively or
predominantly United Kingdom clusters. The estimated divergence times of two of the clusters predate the detection of pan-
demic H1N1/09 virus in the United Kingdom, suggesting that the pandemic H1N1/09 virus was already circulating in the United
Kingdom before the first clinical case. Crucially, three clusters contain isolates from the second wave of infections in the United
Kingdom, two of which represent chains of transmission that appear to have persisted within the United Kingdom between the
first and second waves. This demonstrates that whole-genome analysis can track in fine detail the behavior of individual influ-
enza virus lineages during the course of a single epidemic or pandemic.
Molecular phylogenies can reveal many aspects of the trans-mission, epidemiology, and evolution of rapidly evolving
pathogens (17). Analysis of influenza virus genomes during the
emergence of pandemicH1N1/09 virus, causing the first influenza
pandemic in 40 years, provides a unique opportunity to track the
transmission dynamics of a new influenza virus in an immuno-
logically naïve population. The application of whole-virus ge-
nome sequencing and analysis has already provided detailed in-
sights into seasonal influenza virus infections (5, 18). The
evolutionary dynamics of seasonal influenza A arise from a com-
plex combination of rapid mutation and genome segment reas-
sortment, generating viral diversity that is modulated by natural
selection, global patterns of virus circulation, and host population
biology. The import of influenza A virus strains from tropical
regions such as Southeast Asia, where different virus lineages co-
circulate, may account for the genetic relationships among sea-
sonal epidemics in the northern and southern hemispheres (18,
19). However, the evolutionary dynamics of pandemic influenza
virus lineages during their initial emergence and establishment in
the human population are not well understood.
The detection of a novel influenza A virus of swine origin (pan-
demic H1N1/09 virus) in Mexico and the United States in April
2009 and its subsequent rapid global spread provide a unique
opportunity to observe such dynamics, particularly in regions,
such as the United Kingdom, where virological surveillance is
comprehensive, closely matched to the well-defined chronology
of epidemicwaves, and linked to disease surveillance. The first two
laboratory-confirmed cases in the United Kingdomwere detected
on 27 April 2009, in travellers returning from Mexico, and were
followed by further cases in travellers returning from different
parts of Mexico and the United States. Virus introductions into
the United Kingdom gave rise to secondary and tertiary cases in
chains of transmission and clusters in May and early June (16).
During this time, the United Kingdom initiated a containment
strategy whereby individual cases were investigated and labora-
tory confirmed, contacts traced, and antiviral treatment initiated,
including administration of prophylaxis to close contacts. Grad-
ually, sporadic cases emerged in the community that could not be
linked to specific epidemiological clusters, leading to sustained
community transmission and the first pandemic wave. The first
pandemic wave peaked in July, during which up to 42% of school
children aged 5 to 14 years became infected in high-incidence
areas of the United Kingdom, with clear regional differences in
infection rates (12). Following a decline of pandemic H1N1/09
virus infections over the summer, a second wave of infections
began in mid-September, coincident with the opening of schools,
with an extended peak of infection between themiddle of October
and the middle of November. Characteristics of virus transmis-
sion and disease incidence in the second wave were similar to
those of the first wave, with an estimated total cumulative number
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of symptomatic patients seeking health care of 788,000 (range,
375,000 to 1,644,000).
Analysis of whole-genome pandemic H1N1/09 virus se-
quences demonstrated that distinct lineages arose early during the
pandemic and rapidly disseminated globally (4, 13). Here we have
sequenced the complete genomes of 153 pandemicH1N1/09 virus
isolates from the first and second epidemiological waves in the
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. These data demon-
strate that the first wave of infections in the United Kingdom was
genetically complex, comprising multiple cocirculating and ge-
netically distinct lineages that had each been introduced indepen-
dently to the United Kingdom from elsewhere. We show that at
least two pandemic H1N1/09 virus lineages were circulating be-
fore the first case in the United Kingdom was laboratory con-
firmed. Crucially, our data suggest that at least two United King-
dom transmission chains persisted in the country between the first
and second waves of infections.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sample ethics, origin, and isolation. This was an observational study
undertaken as part of management of a national outbreak. The samples
were taken during routine diagnostic treatment by hospital physicians. It
was carried out under United Kingdom legislationNHSAct 2006 (section
251), which provides statutory support for disclosure of data by the NHS
and their processing by the Health Protection Agency (HPA) for commu-
nicable disease control. Health Protection Scotland is also embedded as
part of theNHS, inwhich the sharing of outbreak and investigation data is
undertaken as part of its role in the coordination of national outbreaks.
Viruses were obtained by isolation from respiratory specimens provided
by sentinel general practitioners (GPs), obtained through self-sampling
schemes, or submitted by hospital diagnostic laboratories. Sentinel sam-
ples were analyzed at the Health Protection Agency Centre for Infections
(CfI) by real-time reverse transcription-PCR (RT-PCR) for detection of
influenza A virus, and viruses were subtyped as seasonal H1 and H3 and
pandemic H1N1 2009 viruses. A range of specimens were selected for cell
culture, including samples representing a broad temporal and geograph-
ical distribution, and also different clinical manifestations, including hos-
pitalized and fatal cases. First-wave sampling attempted to capture a very
large proportion of all infected individuals in the first 8 weeks of the
epidemic in the United Kingdom, whereas the second-wave sampling
represented a return to more normal national virological surveillance.
Representative virology samples were obtained from ill patients in the
community, but there was a focus on hospitalized cases to ensure sam-
pling of severe cases in case of emergence of more virulent strains. The
mean age of first-wave patients was 23.96 years, and that of second-wave
patients was 14.88 years. Viruses were passaged in either Madin-Darby
canine kidney (MDCK) cells or the SIAT1 derivative (10) in the presence
of 2.5 g/ml of trypsin and were stored at 80°C. A total of 153 viruses
were selected for further whole-genome amplification and sequencing:
127 viruses were randomly selected from the first wave (24 April to 10 July
2009), and 26 were selected from the second wave (9 September to 2
December 2009) (see Table S1 in the supplemental material).
RNA isolation, PCR, and sequencing. Virus RNA extraction, PCR,
and sequencing are described in detail in the supplemental material.
Briefly, virus RNA was extracted either from aliquots of original respira-
tory material or from cell-grown viral isolates. Amplification and se-
quencing of influenza virus whole genomes were performed with original
respiratory material or cell-grown isolates. A number of methods were
used. Clinical samples were sequenced by performing two-step RT-PCR
amplification of full or half segments (see Table S2 in the supplemental
material), followed by direct sequencing of the products. Cultured viruses
were sequenced using a two-step RT-PCR approach employing pandemic
H1N1/09 virus-specific PCRprimers containing 5= extensions identical to
the M13F and M13R sequencing primers (see Table S3), similar to the
method described by Ghedin et al. (5). For the second-wave samples,
RNAs from clinical samples were amplified by RT-PCR by the 8-segment
PCRmethod of Zhou et al. (25), with somemodifications. Products were
used as templates for PCRs withM13F/M13R-tailed primers, as described
above, or were sequenced on an Illumina Genome Analyzer IIe sequencer
(see Table S1).
Sequence characterization andphylogenetics.Alignments for all seg-
ments were created individually using CLUSTALW v1.83 (23), manually
inspected, and trimmed to include coding regions only. The coding re-
gions of all segments for each isolate were concatenated, in the order
PB2-PB1-PA-HA-NP-NA-M-NS. The final concatenated alignments
were used for all subsequent evolutionary analyses. Global pandemic
H1N1/09 virus sequences were downloaded from the NCBI influenza
virus database. Only those sequences satisfying the following criteria were
used: (i) genomes must have had complete coverage over all reading
frames; (ii) the year, month, and day of isolate sampling must be known;
and (iii) sequences must have had 20% nucleotide ambiguities. The
complete global pandemic H1N1/09 virus sequence set, including our
UnitedKingdomand Irish sequences, comprised 1,523 sequences. Amax-
imum likelihood phylogeny of the unfiltered global H1N1/09 sequence
set, comprising 1,523 genomes, was estimated using RAxML-VI-HPC
(22) with the GTRGAMMA substitution model and 100 bootstrap repli-
cates.
The resulting data set was further filtered such that for heavily sampled
geographical regions (except the United Kingdom), only one isolate per
location per daywas used. The final number of sequences in the filtered set
was 595 (153 United Kingdom/Republic of Ireland sequences and 442
global sequences). We estimated the phylogeny and divergence times of
the filtered pandemic H1N1/09 virus sequences by using a Bayesian
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach as implemented in the
BEAST package (2). This approach has been validated extensively in the
context of human influenza (18). Evolutionary model specification fol-
lowed that employed for pandemic H1N1/09 virus (3): we used an
HKY substitutionmodel with nucleotide frequencies and substitution
rates estimated from the data (an exponential population growthmodel).
Statistical support informed the use of the relaxed molecular clock as
described previously (3). MCMC chain lengths were 50,000,000 genera-
tions, with sampling every 2,500 generations. Effective sample sizes were
estimated using Tracer (version 1.4; http://beast.bio.ed.ac.uk/Tracer),
and multiple chains were run to check chain convergence. Map anal-
ysis of the spatial locations of United Kingdom viruses was achieved
using MapInfo Professional (version 10.5; PitneyBowes).
BaTS (Bayesian tip significance testing) (15)was used to test for spatial
phylogenetic structure within the United Kingdom and Republic of Ire-
land data set. BaTS calculates two statistics (association index and parsi-
mony score) for a given data set and compares these to their null distri-
butions under the null hypothesis of no correlation between phylogenetic
position and isolate location. A set of 200 trees representing the evolution-
ary history of the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland data set was
obtained using BEAST (using an HKY substitution model; 50 million
MCMC states were computed, with the first 20% discarded as burn-in,
and trees were sampled every 200,000 generations thereafter). Each isolate
was labeled with its corresponding United Kingdom region of sampling
(see Fig. S1 in the supplemental material). We used BaTS to calculate the
association index and parsimony score statistics from these 200 trees and
compared themwith appropriate null distributions (obtained using 1,000
replicates).
Nucleotide sequence accession numbers.All sequences were submit-
ted to GenBank under accession numbers GQ166654 to GQ166661 (A/
England/195/2009), CY065139 to CY065746, and HM567541 to
HM568156 (see Table S1 in the supplemental material).
RESULTS
The first pandemic H1N1/09 wave in the United Kingdom con-
sisted of multiple independent introductions. A total of 153
Baillie et al.
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whole-genome sequences were obtained from original pretreat-
ment clinical samples or virus isolates during the first (n  127)
and second (n  26) waves of United Kingdom infections (Fig.
1a). The coding regions of all gene segments of these isolates were
aligned with a filtered set of global pandemic H1N1/09 virus
whole-genome sequences and used to derive a molecular clock
phylogeny using Bayesian methods as employed in the BEAST
software package (Fig. 2; see Fig. S1 in the supplementalmaterial).
This phylogeny demonstrates the existence of multiple indepen-
dent introductions of pandemic H1N1/09 virus into the United
Kingdomduring the first wave of infections, as opposed to a single
introduction (or a few introductions) followed by clonal expan-
sion.
We sought to identify United Kingdom-specific transmission
chains by using three previously published criteria (7): (i) the
cluster must be significantly supported, with a phylogenetic pos-
terior probability of 95%; (ii) the cluster must contain more than
2 isolates; and (iii) more than 80% of isolates within the cluster
must be sampled in the United Kingdom or Republic of Ireland.
The Republic of Ireland samples were included due to the close
geographical proximity of and large population movements be-
tween the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the rest of
the United Kingdom. By these criteria, we identified 13 United
Kingdomclusters, each containing 3 to 27 isolates, representing 94
(61%) isolates in total (Fig. 1b and 2; Table 1). Clusters were
named to reflect their placement within global clades 1 to 7, de-
fined previously (13); hence, UKC-GC2 indicates United King-
dom cluster C, which falls within global clade 2. To ensure that
United Kingdom clusters were robust to the method of filtering
global pandemic H1N1/09 virus sequences, we confirmed that all
clusters were also intact in a maximum likelihood phylogeny of
the unfiltered sequence set (see Fig. S2 in the supplemental mate-
rial). Clusters UKA1-GC3 andUKA2-GC3 were initially joined in
a larger cluster (cluster UKA-GC3), which also included four ad-
ditional United Kingdom isolates and four non-United Kingdom
isolates. However, three of these United Kingdom isolates were
independent importations, and amaximum likelihood phylogeny
including all global isolates suggested that more non-United
Kingdom isolates grouped with these sequences. For these rea-
sons, the larger cluster UKA-GC3, with95% phylogenetic pos-
terior probability support, was divided into clusters UKA1-GC3
and UKA2-GC3, with the same support.
The United Kingdom-specific transmission clusters were in-
terspersed with isolates from other countries. The remaining
UnitedKingdom isolates appeared as single branches or as pairs of
United Kingdom isolates within groups of isolates from other
countries. The first reported pandemic H1N1/09 virus isolate in
the United Kingdom was sampled from a traveler returning from
Mexico on 27 April 2009. However, our estimates indicate that
pandemic H1N1/09 virus was circulating in the United Kingdom
for up to 1 week prior to this date (Table 1). The inferred date of
common ancestry of all first-wave United Kingdom clusters pre-
dates the first documented sampling of the respective cluster, in
some cases by as much as 20 days (cluster UKC-GC2) (Fig. 1b;
Table 1). The estimated date of origin of one predominantly
United Kingdom cluster (cluster UKA2-GC3) (Fig. 1b and 2) was
20 April 2009 (95% highest posterior density [HPD] range, 13
April 2009 to 26 April 2009), 12 days before the earliest sampling
date from this cluster and 7 days (95% HPD range, 1 to 14 days)
before any pandemic H1N1/09 virus-infected individual was de-
FIG1 (a)Numbers of laboratory-confirmed cases of pandemicH1N1/09 influenza during 2009. (b)Divergence dates and life spans ofUnitedKingdom clusters.
Gray dots represent divergence times of clusters, with bars showing 95% confidence intervals. Orange bars represent ranges of sampling dates of viruses within
each cluster.
Pandemic H1N1/09 Inﬂuenza in United Kingdom
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tected in the United Kingdom. Similarly, cluster UKD-GC5 (Fig.
1b and 2; Table 1) arose on or around 22 April 2009, 5 days (95%
HPD range, 0 to 13 days) before the earliest confirmed United
Kingdom isolate.
Isolates within clusters UKA1-GC3/UKA2-GC3 and UKC-
GC2 were associated predominantly (but not exclusively) with
early, large, individual educational establishment outbreaks in
the United Kingdom. Within cluster UKC-GC2, however, iso-
late A/England/361/2009 was a reported new importation,
A/England/374/2009 was suspected to be a new importation,
and A/England/399/2009 was a community-acquired virus ep-
idemiologically unconnected to the outbreak in this cluster
(Fig. 2; see Fig. S1 in the supplemental material). However, our
sequence data suggest that all of the isolates in cluster UKC-
GC2 were closely linked.
Based on our samples, it appears that themajority of pandemic
H1N1/09 virus transmission chains that comprised the first epi-
demic wave were not sustained in the United Kingdom. There
were no known epidemiological linkages between clusters.
Persistence of first-wave United Kingdom pandemic
H1N1/09 virus strains into the second wave.Most significantly,
it is clear that twoUnited Kingdom clusters (UKK-GC7 andUKL-
GC7) contained isolates from both the first and second waves of
infections. Cluster UKK-GC7 was estimated to have arisen on 13
June 2009 and persisted for at least 175 days, to 24 November.
Similarly, cluster UKI-GC7 was estimated to have arisen on 14
May 2009 and persisted for at least 205 days, to 25 November
(Table 1). This provides the first evidence that individual chains of
pandemic H1N1/09 virus transmission can persist between pan-
demic infection waves in a specific location. In addition, four
FIG 2 Simplified BEAST tree showing distribution of United Kingdom isolates in the context of global pandemic H1N1/09 virus isolates. United Kingdom
lineages are shown with red lines, and all other lineages are shown with black lines. United Kingdom-specific clusters are indicated by gray boxes with adjacent
cluster labels. Red dots indicate nodes with95% posterior support, and orange dots indicate nodes with posterior support of95% but80%. Amino acid
changes which characterize global cluster 7 are shown adjacent to the branches on which they likely occurred. Known (or suspected) importations are indicated
with an asterisk adjacent to the terminal branch. Some groups with high posterior support are collapsed for clarity. Blue, pink, and yellow bars represent
predetection, first-wave, and second-wave phases of the pandemic in theUnited Kingdom. The full tree with taxon names is shown in Fig. S1 in the supplemental
material.
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second-wave United Kingdom isolates that do not belong to a
defined global cluster also group with United Kingdom sequences
related to cluster UKK-GC7 from the first wave, but statistical
support for this grouping is not significant (Fig. 2). In contrast, the
remaining United Kingdom clusters appeared only in the first
wave of infection (Fig. 1b and 2).
Cluster UKG-GC7 comprised only isolates from the second
wave of infection in theUnited Kingdom. This transmission chain
was placed phylogeneticallywithin a large andpersistent lineage of
U.S. isolates (fromNew York State, California, District of Colum-
bia, and Texas) (Fig. 2). Therefore, it is highly likely that cluster
UKG-GC7 originated in the United States. Cluster UKG-GC7 ap-
pears to have been present for some time (60 days) before first
being detected, which most likely reflects less intense sampling of
isolates in both the United Kingdom and the United States as the
pandemic progressed during 2009.
Of the remaining second-wave United Kingdom samples, five
grouped together with other second-wave isolates from Russia,
Norway, Greece, Poland, and Denmark, and six were distributed
throughout the tree. Two viruses from Russia and Denmark
grouped with United Kingdom isolates within cluster UKL-GC7.
The identical genetic composition of the Russian virus and its
earlier sampling date, which took place during the first United
Kingdom wave, suggest that a similar virus may have given rise to
these second-wave United Kingdom viruses. Viruses within clus-
ter UKL-GC7 may therefore have been undetected in sampling in
the United Kingdom during the first wave or introduced into the
United Kingdom prior to the second wave.
Signature amino acid substitutions define United Kingdom
pandemic H1N1/09 virus clusters. We next sought to identify
amino acid changes in the United Kingdom isolates and clusters
with possible biological or antigenic relevance. Based on signature
nonsynonymous changes, we concluded that all of the United
Kingdom lineages are found within clades defined previously as
circulating worldwide (13). Clusters UKA1-GC3 and UKA2-GC3
fall within global clade 3, clusters UKB-GC2 and UKC-GC2 fall
within global clade 2 (changes in PA [M581L] and nucleoprotein
[NP] [T373I] relative to clade 3), cluster UKD-GC5 falls within
global clade 5 (changes in NP [V100I] and neuraminidase [NA]
[V106I and N248D]), cluster UKE-GC6 falls within global clade 6
(changes in hemagglutinin [HA] [K2E and Q310H], NP [V100I],
and NA [V106I and N248D]), and the remaining United King-
dom clusters (UKF-GC7 to UKL-GC7) fall within global clade 7
(changes in HA [S220T], NP [V100I], NA [V106I and N248D],
andNS1 [I123V]). Our estimated divergence time for global clade
7 is 2 to 3April 2009 (95%HPDrange, 22March to 12April 2009),
which is slightly earlier but not significantly different from that
estimated previously (95% HPD range, 28 March to 18 April
2009) (13). Interestingly, the signature amino acid changes seen in
viruses from clusters UKF-GC7, UKG-GC7, UKH-GC7, UKI-
GC7, UKK-GC7, and UKL-GC7, and which define global clade 7,
predominated in the most recent pandemic H1N1/09 virus iso-
lates worldwide (11).
Some United Kingdom clusters possessed signature coding
changes which further distinguished them from the global isolates
(see Fig. S3 and Table S4 in the supplemental material), although
none of the United Kingdom cluster-specific changes were at po-
sitions likely to affect pathogenicity, drug resistance, or HA recep-
tor binding (as previously described for other influenza A virus
human subtypes). Some United Kingdom isolates and clusters
showed amino acid changes of possible antigenic significance (see
the supplemental material). However, none of the United King-
dom viruses with or without these changes had significant reduc-
tions in hemagglutination inhibition (HI) titers against A/Califor-
nia/07/2009 (pandemic vaccine strain) or A/England/195/2009
(United Kingdom prototype virus) ferret antisera. One United
Kingdom isolate (A/Scotland/10/2009) possessed a glycine (G) at
position 222 and was isolated from a sample taken late during the
course of a fatal illness. This change has been noted in some severe
and fatal cases of pandemic H1N1 influenza (8, 9, 24).
Geographical locations of clusters and isolates. We used the
geographical location of the individual from whom each sample
TABLE 1 Divergence times and detection ranges of United Kingdom clusters
Cluster
No. of
isolates
% of isolates
from United
Kingdom/
Republic of
Ireland TMRCA
TMRCA Date of isolation
Maximum
duration
(days)a Summaryb
Pre-UK
detection
(days)c
Precluster
detection
(days)d
Low 95%
HPD
High 95%
HPD
Earliest UK
isolate
Latest UK
isolate
UKA1-GC3 3 100.00 26 Apr 2009 21 Apr 2009 28 Apr 2009 28 Apr 2009 30 Apr 2009 9 1st wave 1 2
UKA2-GC3 14 100.00 20 Apr 2009 13 Apr 2009 26 Apr 2009 2 May 2009 15 May 2009 32 1st wave 7 12
UKB-GC2 3 100.00 27 Apr 2009 21 Apr 2009 30 Apr 2009 30 Apr 2009 8 May 2009 17 1st wave 0 3
UKC-GC2 27 100.00 7 May 2009 26 Apr 2009 15 May 2009 27 May 2009 8 Jun 2009 43 1st wave 0 20
UKD-GC5 3 100.00 22 Apr 2009 14 Apr 2009 27 Apr 2009 27 Apr 2009 28 Apr 2009 14 1st wave 5 5
UKE-GC6 4 100.00 20 May 2009 13 May 2009 25 May 2009 26 May 2009 4 Jun 2009 22 1st wave 0 6
UKF-GC7 8 100.00 3 May 2009 26 Apr 2009 9 May 2009 11 May 2009 15 May 2009 19 1st wave 0 8
UKG-GC7 5 100.00 21 Aug 2009 27 Jul 2009 15 Sep 2009 20 Oct 2009 24 Nov 2009 120 2nd wave 0 60
UKH-GC7 3 100.00 31 May 2009 23 May 2009 4 Jun 2009 4 Jun 2009 8 Jun 2009 16 1st wave 0 4
UKI-GC7 3 100.00 28 May 2009 21 May 2009 31 May 2009 31 May 2009 4 Jun 2009 14 1st wave 0 3
UKJ-GC7 4 100.00 27 May 2009 21 May 2009 1 Jun 2009 1 Jun 2009 8 Jun 2009 18 1st wave 0 5
UKK-GC7 5 100.00 13 Jun 2009 2 Jun 2009 21 Jun 2009 23 Jun 2009 24 Nov 2009 175 Persistent 0 10
UKL-GC7 12 83.33 14 May 2009 3 May 2009 22 May 2009 26 May 2009 25 Nov 2009 205 Persistent 0 12
a Time between TMRCA (low 95% HPD) and latest United Kingdom isolate.
b 1st wave, cluster contains first-wave isolates only; 2nd wave, cluster contains second-wave isolates only; persistent, cluster contains isolates from both first and second waves.
c Time between TMRCA and first detected pandemic H1N1/09 case in the United Kingdom (27 April 2009).
d Time between TMRCA and earliest detection date within cluster.
Pandemic H1N1/09 Inﬂuenza in United Kingdom
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was obtained in the context of the genetically defined transmission
chains to examine the spatial pattern of pandemic H1N1/09 virus
spread within the United Kingdom. The initial period of the first
wave (global clades 2, 3, 5, and 6; UnitedKingdom clusters A1, A2,
B, C, D, and E) was dominated by isolates from London and the
Southeast and East of England (Fig. 3; see Fig. S1 in the supple-
mentalmaterial). UKC-GC2,which containsmany isolates from a
single educational establishment outbreak, is complex, with iso-
late locations spread geographically within the East, the Southeast,
and the London area. Isolates that were not within definedUnited
Kingdom clusters also tended to be located predominantly in the
East, the Southeast, and the London area during this time. While
this may reflect a sampling bias for the larger clusters, the similar
trend for noncluster isolates (12 of 18 isolates located in the East,
the Southeast, and the London area) supports a degree of geo-
graphical restriction early in the first wave. With the arrival of
global clade 7 isolates (UKF-GC7 to UKL-GC7), more extensive
spread to most United Kingdom regions was observed. Interest-
ingly, UKK-GC7 and UKL-GC7, which persisted from the first to
the second wave, contained isolates from many United Kingdom
regions, suggesting that persistence was not constrained geo-
graphically (Fig. 3; see Fig. S1). Complex transmission dynamics
are more evident with ultrafine spatial mapping (Fig. 3). From
genome sequences alone, United Kingdom clusters are clearly dis-
tinct, but they are otherwise similar in their phylogenetic profiles.
However, clusters A and F were geographically constrained in two
distinct regions of London (Fig. 3C), whereas cluster C isolates
occurred in and around distinct parts of London as well as other
United Kingdom regions (Fig. 3A to C). Clusters E and G, in
contrast, showed wide spatial distributions within the East, the
Southeast, and the London area, indicating that different trans-
mission chain dynamics were clearly visible early in pandemic
H1N1/09 virus introduction into the United Kingdom. The BaTS
analysis of the spatial phylogenetic structure within the United
Kingdom and Republic of Ireland data set showed that there was a
significant (P  0.001) association between the regions from
which isolates originated and their phylogenetic relationships.
However, we note that the statistical significance of this result is
perhaps raised artificially as a result of the intense sampling of
some local outbreaks, particularly those in London (UKA1-GC3
and UKA2-GC3) and the Southeast (UKC-GC2).
DISCUSSION
Wehave used influenza virus whole-genome sequences combined
with sophisticated evolutionary analysis to estimate themolecular
epidemiological characteristics of pandemic H1N1 influenza in
the United Kingdom. The distribution of United Kingdom-
specific clusters and individual United Kingdom isolates through-
out the global pandemicH1N1/09 virus phylogeny proves that the
epidemic in theUnited Kingdom resulted frommultiple indepen-
dent introductions of the virus into the country during the first
wave of infection. None of the viruses analyzed in this study,more
broadly as part of United Kingdom surveillance, or worldwide
FIG 3 (A) Geographical distribution of viruses belonging to global clade-United Kingdom phylogenetic clusters. Two viruses isolated in the Republic of Ireland
were also included. Magnified views of the Midlands (B) and the London area (C) are shown. Virus isolates are colored according to whether they were isolated
in the first (pink) or second (blue) infection wave, with the United Kingdom cluster for each isolate identified by the cluster letter shown in Fig. 2.
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showed any evidence of significant antigenic divergence from
A/California/07/2009, although they are genetically distinct.
Epidemiological tracking of cases during this period suggested
that there were laboratory-confirmed cases from at least 60 dis-
tinct introductions, grouping into at least 9 different epidemio-
logically defined clusters. In addition to the 13 United Kingdom
clusters we defined here (containing 94 of the 153 isolates se-
quenced), there were 52 isolates, widespread geographically in the
United Kingdom, distributed throughout our phylogeny. This
suggests that our sampling of the lineages that arrived in the
United Kingdom at the start of the outbreak was reasonably com-
plete and that the 13 clusters and 52 dispersed lineages account for
much of the United Kingdom pandemic H1N1/09 virus genetic
diversity. Standard power calculations to add support to this ob-
servation are not possible, however, as sequences are not statisti-
cally independent observations but are in fact highly correlated
due to the presence of shared ancestry.
Based on our analysis, at least one United Kingdom cluster
(cluster UKA2-GC3) began to diverge 1 week (95%HPD range, 1
to 14 days) before the first clinically diagnosed United Kingdom
case. The node which connects clusters UKA1-GC3 and UKA2-
GC3, although poorly supported (posterior probability 
0.3542), has a time ofmost recent common ancestor (TMRCA) of
13 April 2009, suggesting that pandemic H1N1/09 virus was al-
ready spreading undetected in the United Kingdom around the
same time that it was identified in Mexico, presumably as a result
of unidentified infections in returning travelers. Note that there
were approximately 5,000 travelers per week to and fromMexico
in the weeks immediately preceding the first confirmed introduc-
tion to the United Kingdom.
The reasons for the apparent lag between the introductions of
pandemic H1N1/09 virus into the United Kingdom and the peak
of first-wave infections are not known. The spread of A/H1N1/09
in mainland Europe during the first wave in the United Kingdom
was characterized by sporadic cases and isolated self-limiting out-
breaks linked to importations. In the United Kingdom, however,
the major generalized epidemic occurred in June and July and
declined only once schools closed for the summer holidays at the
end of July (6). No equivalent epidemic wave was reported in
Europe until the autumn, during which time theUnited Kingdom
had its second wave of infection. The beginning of the second
wave in the United Kingdom also coincided with the reopening of
schools after the summer holiday period. It is possible that the
United Kingdom public health response, which was comprehen-
sive and applied consistently during the early phases and which
consisted of laboratory confirmation of suspected cases followed
by antiviral prophylaxis of contacts, may have contributed to this
delay. Antiviral prophylaxis appears to be effective at reducing
household transmission (R. G. Pebody et al., unpublished data),
suggesting that the strict prophylaxis policy acted to extinguish
some of the early viral introductions, possibly slowing the rate of
rise of the pandemic.
We were able to show clear evidence of virus lineage persis-
tence in the United Kingdom between the first and second epi-
demicwaves. A prominent characteristic of influenza epidemics in
temperate regions is their seasonality, with the majority of infec-
tions occurring during the winter months in the northern and
southern hemispheres, in contrast to year-round influenza virus
circulation across tropical regions. This has led to the hypothesis
that influenza virus genetic diversity is generated continually in
tropical regions, primarily Southeast Asia, from where viral lin-
eages migrate to temperate regions each year, founding the next
seasonal epidemic (18, 19). Here we found two United Kingdom-
specific clusters that appeared in the first wave of infection and
persisted into the second wave of infections. The density of our
sampling and phylogenetic inference suggest that this reflects true
persistence rather than reintroduction within the United King-
dom between the epidemic waves. Additional HA gene sequenc-
ing of influenza virus isolates between the first and second waves
showed that viruses of cluster UKK-GC7, which arose in the
United Kingdom in June and possessed the signature amino acid
substitution D222E, were present and circulating in the United
Kingdom between July and September 2009. The likelihood of
persistence is further supported by intensive surveillance as a con-
sequence of the national response to the pandemic, which clearly
indicates that there were low levels of infection sustained in the
community in individuals without any history of travel abroad, as
well as sporadic travel-associated cases. In 2009, persistence may
have been facilitated by the timing of the waves, as the majority of
first-wave infections occurred during the summer months in the
United Kingdom (with a peak in late July), whereas the second
wave of infections started in September and peaked earlier
(October-November) than usual for seasonal influenza epidem-
ics. Consequently, the time between waves wasmuch shorter than
that for typical seasonal influenza, where the length of time be-
tween the endof onewinterwave and the onset of an autumnwave
may be asmuch as 8 to 9months. Furthermore, a recent study also
suggested that the occurrence of two consecutive waves in the
United Kingdom, as opposed to only sporadic cases in the rest of
Europe during the summer, was a consequence of a relatively large
number of early importations (as demonstrated here) combined
with a low level of absolute humidity, which has been shown to
affect both transmissibility and the survival of influenza virus (20).
The relative immunological naïvety of the human population to
the pandemic H1N1/09 variant may also have enabled higher-
than-usual infection rates during the interwave period. Whatever
the underlying mechanism, it seems that influenza virus contin-
ued to circulate in the United Kingdom between infection peaks
without causing a sustained level of clinical disease.
It is important to consider the benefits that are brought by
real-time monitoring of virus genome diversity during a pan-
demic or epidemic. The very-high-resolution tracking of individ-
ual lineages is achievable only with full genome sequences. Cou-
pled with spatial information, we show that detailed insight into
transmission chains and epidemiology becomes apparent, extend-
ing what can be observed by use of sequences alone (1, 14, 21).
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